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Abstract— Many businesses and educational facilities employ some 
form of filtering to control what internet sites their users may 
browse. This is done to help protect network assets, to protect data 
from being stolen and to comply with company policies on internet 
usage. Anonymous proxies (or web proxies) can be used by the end 
users to bypass most filtering systems put in place by businesses 
and this can remove the protection that the filtering systems 
provide for the network. For instance, unless the web proxy being 
used is being hosted by the end user or someone they know, then 
the identity of whoever is hosting the proxy is unknown and they 
potentially cannot be trusted. The proxy website could also have 
been set up to eavesdrop on the data flow between the end user’s 
machine and the internet. Sites set up to do this would normally log 
information for later inspection and data sent from a business 
user’s machine could contain potentially confidential information 
about the company or the user themselves. This research aims to 
identify the characteristics or signatures whenever a user is using a 
web proxy by developing a Detection System that records packets 
and analyses them looking for identifying patterns of web proxies. 
One of the main focuses of the research will be in detecting the 
usage of proxy websites that make use of SSL to encrypt the 
contents of their packets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A proxy server, in terms of computer networks, is a server 
that acts as an intermediary for requests from clients for 
resources located on other servers on a network or the Internet. 
This is the most basic type of proxy which is known as a gateway. 
Another type of proxy is a reverse proxy. This consists of a 
server on an internal company network and acts as an 
intermediary for other servers based on that network. Reverse 
proxies are typically used as an Internet facing server that 
handles a number of different tasks. Some examples include: 
SSL acceleration using specially designed hardware for the 
encryption and decryption of SSL traffic, load balancing to 
distribute requests between several web servers and acting as a 
cache for static content such as pictures and other graphical 
content. The proxies that will be discussed in this research are 
anonymising proxies which are based on another type of proxy 
known as an open proxy. Open proxies are a proxy that is 
available to any user on the Internet. They are mostly used to set 
up anonymous proxy websites. Anonymising proxy sites act as 
an intermediary, forwarding requests and fetching the results, 
whilst also hiding a user’s identity by concealing their IP address 
from web servers on the Internet. This type of server is regularly 
used as a means to hide a criminal’s identity so they can commit 
various crimes on the internet without being caught. There are 
also a number of risks with using an anonymous proxy as a 
method to bypass network filters on a company network. The 
anonymous proxy server might not be a simple intermediary that 
only forwards requests and fetches the results. It could also be 
logging all the requests and information that pass through it. This 
information could include usernames and passwords and the 
operators of the proxy site may use these to steal the identity 
linked to the credentials and use it to commit fraud and other 
criminal actions. A user employing an anonymous proxy on an 
enterprise network to bypass a network filter might be, 
unwittingly, leaking confidential information about their 
company. To combat this issue we propose a system that will 
detect suspicious traffic on the network and attempt to determine 
whether the traffic indicates the usage of an anonymous proxy 
website. The system will specifically check for characteristics 
that appear in packets generated by anonymous proxies and then 
create rules to determine the usage of anonymous proxies. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. IP Blocking 
IP blocking is the most basic technique used to combat 
malicious threats to networks and is one of the most commonly 
used techniques for protecting networks [1]. Using this method 
an administrator can block an IP address or a range of IP 
addresses from accessing a certain domain name IP address. A 
network administrator can also block access to an IP address that 
is being used by a disruptive user. IP blocking can however be 
overcome by using anonymising proxies. The user’s IP address 
is usually sent out as a source IP address in the network packet 
containing the request to a web server. However, when using a 
proxy, this request is first sent to the proxy server which then 
forwards it on towards the web server. This forwarded request is 
encased in a new network packet which means that the source IP 
address is no longer that of the end user but instead is that of the 
proxy server. So, the blocked IP address of the user is not 
actually making any direct contact with the web server running 
the IP filter. The network administrator may also block the IP 
addresses of websites that they do not want users to access, but 
in this case a proxy will separate the business network and the 
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website being accessed. The IP block filter will only detect the 
IP of the proxy site, which will likely not be in the filter’s block 
list. Figure 1 shows how the proxy is located between the user 
and the website they are trying to access. 
B. Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems  
A significant security problem for business type networks is 
hostile or unwanted access by users or software [2]. Unwanted 
user access (an intrusion) can be in the form of unauthorised 
logon to a machine or gaining the ability to perform higher 
privilege actions than what is normally authorised. Unwanted 
software access can take the form of a virus, Trojan horse or 
other form of malware. To combat these intrusions there are a 
number of defences. There are host based security methods that 
are managed by the operating system of the machine, various 
types of firewall used to filter network packets, such as Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems 
(IPS). A firewall is defined as a component or set of components 
that restrict access between a protected network and external 
networks [3].  
Intrusion Detection Systems detect intrusions on a network. 
IDSs come in many different configurations, two of which are 
Host-based IDS (HIDS) and Network-based IDS (NIDS). The 
difference between these two is the location of the IDS on the 
network. A HIDS monitors and collects the characteristics for 
hosts containing sensitive information, servers running public 
services and suspicious activities [4]. To detect intrusions to the 
network HIDSs typically follow one of two general approaches. 
These are anomaly detection and signature detection. Anomaly 
detection involves the collection of data relating to behaviour of 
legitimate users over a period of time. Next, tests are applied to 
observed behaviour to determine if it involves an illegitimate 
user. Signature detection involves a set of rules or attack patterns 
that can be used to decide if an observed behaviour is that of an 
attacker [4]. A NIDS captures network traffic at specific points 
of a network through sensors and then analyses the activities of 
applications and protocols to recognise suspicious incidents [4]. 
A typical NIDS configuration includes a number of sensors to 
monitor network traffic, a NIDS management server and one or 
more user interface consoles for human interaction with the IDS. 
The analysis of network traffic may occur at either the sensor 
and/or the management server. As with HIDSs, NIDSs make use 
of both anomaly detection and signature detection [4]. 
C. Proxies 
Anonymous web proxies come in many different forms. 
Some proxy scripts are produced using PHP based or CGI 
(Common Gateway Interface) based scripts. The reasoning 
behind the use of these technologies is that they both provide the 
functionality that an anonymous proxy requires and they are 
compatible with both UNIX-like and Windows hosts. To access 
the anonymous proxy a user client needs to connect to the proxy 
server first. From there, they are then able to send a request to 
the website anonymously. The proxy script takes the clients 
request and issues its own request to the destination website, 
receives the data back and forwards it on to the client. This is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Web ServerClient Proxy Server  
Fig. 1 Proxy connection 
 
Glype is a PHP based script and is one of the most common and 
popular web proxy scripts available on the internet. This is due 
to its support for content like JavaScript and to its ease of set up 
and use. To set up a Glype proxy server, a user must download 
the proxy files from the Glype website and then relocate the files 
to the correct directories on their webserver. Another option 
would be to use one of the many existing proxy sites already 
available. The Glype website provides a list of working proxy 
servers whose administrators have paid to have their site listed 
in the hope of increasing the popularity of their own server. At 
the time of writing this list contained 3,389 unique servers. This 
list, however only represents those that have paid to have better 
exposure; there are possibly many more Glype proxy servers. 
This presents a problem when trying to block access to these 
proxies because there are so many. This makes it difficult to 
compile a complete list to add to an IP block list or ACL. In 
addition, because it is so easy to set up the proxy, new servers 
are being added all the time. URL filtering will not work either 
as the majority of proxy servers based on the Glype script will 
have some form of URL obfuscation available. The most 
popular methods of obfuscation are encoding the URL using 
either base64 or ROT-13 encoding. Other methods of encoding 
exist, but these are the main ones used by the Glype script. 
The CGIProxy is a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) script 
that acts as a HTTP, HTTPS or FTP proxy. CGI scripts can be 
programmed in a number of different languages. CGIProxy is 
programmed using the interpreted language Perl. While Glype 
proxies enable URL obfuscation by default, the CGIProxy script 
does not. ROT13 encoding can be enabled by removing the line 
comments for the methods proxy_encode() and proxy_decode() 
in the script. The script also provides support for custom 
encoding code to be added such as hexadecimal encoding. 
D. SSL/TLS 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) are security protocols for establishing an 
encrypted link between a server and a client, for example, a 
website server and a user’s browser (Digicert, 2014). SSL and 
TLS operate on top of TCP allowing protocols on higher layers 
of the network stack, such as HTTP, to be left unchanged while 
still providing a secure connection. Underneath the SSL layer, 
HTTP is identical to HTTPS. After building the TCP connection, 
the client starts the SSL handshake with the server. The 
handshake protocol is where the client and server agree on a 
protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms and 
authenticate each other [5]. After the handshake is established, 
the server will send its certificate to the client. This certificate is 
used to verify the server’s identity by the client. The certificate 
must be trusted by the client or by a party that the client trusts in 
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order for the identity of the server to be verified. Once the 
certificate has been verified, a key, most likely a public key, may 
be exchanged depending on the cryptographic algorithm that the 
client and server agreed upon. Both the client and server 
compute a key for the symmetric encryption session and the 
client tells the server that all communication will be encrypted 
going forward. The client sends an encrypted and authenticated 
message to the server which then verifies that the message can 
be correctly decrypted and sends an encrypted message in 
response. The connection is now secure and both parties can 
communicate securely. Figure 2 shows the interaction between 
client and server as the handshake process progresses. 
 
Client Server
Client connects to server
Server connects to Client
Server sends certificate
Server requests Client certificate
Client sends certificate
and verifies server certificate
Client generates a cryptographic
key
Server verifies key
Handshake established
 
Fig2: SSL/TLS Handshake protocol 
 
 Any attackers that may be eavesdropping on the connection at 
this point will not be able to see any of the encrypted message 
contents apart from perhaps the source and destination IP 
addresses, the ports being connected to and what encryption 
scheme is being used. SSL originated as a method for setting up 
and maintaining encrypted communications on the internet. It 
was designed to be platform independent and to be a generic 
transport layer mechanism, but the internet remains as its main 
user [6].  The most recent incarnation of SSL was 3.0 which was 
released in 1996 and was published by IETF in RFC [5]. TLS 
1.0 was then defined in RFC 2246 in 1999 as an upgrade to SSL 
3.0 [7] and included a mechanism which allows a TLS 
implementation to downgrade down to SSL 3.0 again for 
compatibility reasons. TLS is, at the time of writing, on version 
1.2 [8] with version 1.3 being drafted and not fully defined yet. 
E. The Onion router 
Tor is a circuit-based low latency anonymous communication 
service that is based on the onion routing principles the Naval 
Research Laboratory [9][10]. It was initially released as a 
method for anonymous and secure communication with the goal 
of allowing military personnel to work online undercover, but 
was later released to the general public. It is now maintained by 
a group of volunteers called The Tor Project. In the first version 
of onion routing, instead of making a direct connection to a web 
server from a client machine, applications on the client side 
make connections through a sequence of machines called onion 
routers [9]. This network of onion routers allows the connection 
between the initiator and responder to remain anonymous. The 
network is accessed through a series of proxies starting with a 
socket connection from a client application to an application 
proxy. This proxy manipulates the connection format and 
changes it to a generic form that can be passed through the onion 
routing network. It then connects to an onion proxy, which is the 
part of the network that defines the route through the network by 
constructing a layered data structure called an onion. This 
structure is then passed to the first onion router. An onion router 
that receives an onion peels off a layer of the onion structure, 
identifies the next router in the sequence and sends the 
embedded onion to that router until the last layer is removed and 
the data is sent to the end point of the sequence. Before sending 
data over this connection, the onion proxy adds a layer of 
encryption for each onion router present in the route. As data 
moves through the connection each onion router removes one 
layer of encryption along with a layer of the onion structure so 
it arrives as plaintext. On the way back through the connection, 
the layers of the onion structure are added back on along with 
the corresponding layers of encryption [9]. The Tor project is 
known as the second generation Onion Routing system  [10]. 
Tor was released to address limitations in the original onion 
routing design by adding a number of features that would 
improve the operation of the system. The biggest difference 
between the two is that Tor runs on the live Internet, whereas the 
original design was mostly operated on a single machine as a 
proof-of-concept. 
F. MiTM attacks, ARP Spoofing 
One method that can be used to intercept communications 
between two parties is ARP Spoofing (also known as ARP 
Poisoning). ARP spoofing occurs when an attacker, who is on 
the same Local Area Network (LAN) as an end user, sends fake 
Address Resolution Protocol messages to that user’s computer 
[11]. These messages are sent to convince the user’s computer 
that the attacker’s medium access control (MAC) address is the 
MAC address of, for example, the gateway router of that 
network. This interception of communications makes use of a 
weakness in the ARP protocol which does not have any means 
to check and verify the identities of machines using it [12]. 
Through ARP spoofing, an attacker can then move on to perform 
what is known as a Man in the Middle (MitM) attack. Figure 3 
shows a typical layout for a MitM attack. 
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Web ServerVictim
Attacker
MitM Connection
Original Connection 
 
Fig 3: A typical Man in the Middle layout 
 
This attack is a common way to interfere with 
communications between two parties. To execute a MitM attack, 
an attacker sets up a form of ARP spoof between two parties that 
are attempting to communicate with each other. The attacker 
will then create two simultaneous connections, one to each of 
the connected parties, and impersonate both parties at the ends 
of both connections. The two communicating parties view the 
connection as if they were actually connected directly, not 
noticing that the connection is being intercepted. Once 
connected, the attacker has access to network traffic flowing in 
both directions and can begin to sniff the connections for 
valuable information, such as bank details or website credentials, 
or modify the data being transmitted to include malicious code. 
G. Comparison to other work 
There are a number of commercial solutions available 
currently for the detection and blocking of anonymous proxy 
usage. A number of examples and a comparison of what methods 
they use for detecting proxies and other capabilities they have is 
presented in table 1. The methods include URL filters, IP Filters, 
Packet Analysis, SSL Detection, HTTP Header Filters, Adaptive 
Rule Definition, Pre-defined Rules and IP Geolocation. 
CIPAFilter is an enterprise level solution intended for use by 
schools. It is based on either a desktop server, a rack mounted 
server or as a virtual server. It captures network traffic by forcing 
students to connect to the internet through the server, with the 
server acting as a forwarding proxy. It then compares URLs of 
websites visited with a list of known anonymising proxy 
websites and then blocks the communication. The problem with 
this approach is that the list of anonymising proxies is changing 
all the time. As proxy sites are blocked, new sites are set up to 
replace them so a lot of time and effort needs to be expended in 
making sure that the URL lists are up to date. Exinda is very 
similar to the CIPAFilter solution, also making use of a list of 
proxy websites and is also based on rack mounted servers of 
varying capabilities.  
IP2Proxy uses a different technique for spotting anonymous 
proxy traffic. Instead of keeping a list of proxy websites, it 
analyses network packets and looks for the HTTP header 
HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR. Whenever a proxy is tasked 
with forwarding traffic without masking the identity of the 
original client, then they will include this header and the IP 
address of the original machine. However this is an optional 
header and many anonymising proxies opt to not include it in 
any forwarded requests in order to hide the identity of the client. 
The Glype proxy script even allows for fake information to be 
provided, including showing what operating system and browser 
the user is using, to further throw off trackers.  
Snort is a popular packet capture and intrusion detection 
application that is compatible with both Windows and Linux 
operating systems. It can run in one of three modes: Packet 
Sniffer, Packet logger or Network Intrusion Detection System. 
When running as an intrusion detection system, Snort detects 
and analyses suspicious traffic based on pre-defined rules. It 
comes with a default set of rules to allow users to get snort set 
up and working initially and it also allows users to define and 
add their own rules. Rules for detecting the usage of proxy 
websites based on PHP and CGI scripts were defined by John 
Brozycki that can be used to instantly send an alert whenever 
proxy traffic is detected or, in the hands of more advanced users 
of snort, even block proxy traffic [13].  
MAXMIND offers a proxy detection service on top of their 
geo location and fraud prevention services. It involves passing 
an IP address to one of their data centres where the address is 
compared against a list of IP addresses suspected of being an 
anonymous proxy. This however runs into the same problem as 
using a URL list.  
ModSecurity is an open source, cross platform compatible, 
application firewall that can offer proxy detection and blocking 
when configured to detect GeoIP country code mismatches 
between the IP address of the final host connecting to a web 
server and the first IP address listed in the X-Forwarded-For 
HTTP request header. This makes use of geolocation data 
through integration with geolocation databases such as 
MAXMIND. If an anonymous proxy is being used then the IP 
address of the host connecting to the server will be that of the 
proxies and this will clash with the IP address listed in the X-
Forwarded-For header. However, as with IP2Proxy, this runs 
into the problem of anonymous proxy hosts choosing to remove 
the X-Forwarded-For header from the forwarded requests, 
leaving the firewall with just the proxy server’s IP address and 
nothing to compare it to. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of related applications 
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III. PROXY DETECTION SYSTEM 
The proposed system will be a form of network-based 
intrusion detection system, developed specifically to detect the 
use of anonymous proxy scripts in a business or corporate 
network environment. It will include a number of different 
components, each with a specific task to perform. These are IP 
geolocation, a method for getting around SSL encryption used 
by a growing number of proxy sites and a proxy detection 
algorithm. Underlying these components will be the capability 
to capture network packets in real time in a similar way to the 
packet analysis software Wireshark . 
IP geolocation will provide information on where, 
geographically, network packets are coming from. This will be 
used to help detect the usage of an anonymous proxy by 
comparing the location data to an online database in a similar 
style to an IP block list. Depending on the location of the server 
that an anonymous proxy is running on, the network packets will 
be passed on for further analysis by the proxy detection system. 
The method for getting around SSL encryption that may be 
used by proxy sites will be based on a penetration testing tool 
called sslstrip. It is a form of MITM attack that forces a user’s 
browser into communicating with an adversary in plain-text over 
HTTP. This is possible because many HTTPS sites are normally 
accessed from a HTTP 302 redirect on a HTTP page. The 
connection is intercepted before the redirect can take place and 
modify it to redirect to the HTTP version of a site e.g. 
https://twitter.com would become http://twitter.com. The 
adversary then acts like a proxy and forwards the 
communication on to the internet as normal, using either HTTP 
or HTTPS depending on what is being requested whilst 
maintaining the HTTP connection between user and adversary. 
The “adversary” in the case of this project would be the proxy 
detection system in an attempt to gain access to encrypted 
network packets that are being sent to and from anonymous 
proxies for deeper analysis of their contents.  
The proxy detection will be the last part in this sequence. This 
will be the part of the system that will perform the analysis of 
suspicious network packets. The analysis will be based on the 
patterns of proxy traffic discussed above. The patterns will be 
included in a comparison as a rule base for the system. The 
system will compare network packets that are captured with the 
rules in real time. If an anonymising proxy is detected then the 
system will create a log of the detection that includes the packet 
that was analysed and the time and date it was captured. An alert 
to the network administrator will also be sent to inform them of 
the detection. 
A. Design of the system 
This system will monitor a network by capturing packets as 
they go to and from the network and comparing the contents of 
the packets against a set of rules. Figure 4 shows the architecture 
of the network for the proxy detection system. The system is 
located between 2 firewalls; one controlling access to and from 
the internet and another controlling access to the innermost 
network where the client machines reside. This creates an area 
known as a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) which is a subnetwork 
that provides an additional layer of security to a network, 
separating a business’ local intranet from the wider Internet. 
This is known as the perimeter of the network.  
 
 
Fig 4: Network architecture 
 
Figure 5 shows the sequence of interactions between the 
individual components of the system including the interaction 
between the client and network admin. The case shown in figure 
5 is a user attempting to use an anonymising proxy to access a 
website. In this case the system will use all three components to 
analyse and identify behaviours belonging to the proxy traffic 
and notify the network administrator about the proxy usage. 
 
 
Fig 5: Sequence Interaction diagram 
B. Software Analysis 
Potential software tools are being investigated for the 
development of the proxy detection system. These tools include 
the general programming language Python as well as the 
network penetration testing tool sslstrip. Python is supported on 
both Windows and Unix-like based systems which means that 
the system will not be dependent on a single operating system. 
It also has generous support for packet snuffing and capture 
through the inclusion of the Scapy or Libpcap libraries. 
SSL stripping is a concept that was developed by Moxie 
Marlinspike in 2009. It is a form of man in the middle attack that 
allows an attacker to prevent a web browser from upgrading an 
unencrypted HTTP connection to a HTTPS connection that is 
encrypted using SSL or TLS. He developed the tool sslstrip that 
was previously discussed above. The idea behind sslstrip is that 
users only encountered SSL in one of two ways, they either 
clicked on a hyperlink such as a login button or through a HTTP 
302 redirect. What happens with the 302 redirect is a user will 
usually not type the “https://” prefix into the URL address bar. 
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Instead they will type in “website.com” which the browser will 
automatically interpret as a request for 
“http://www.website.com”. If the website being requested only 
normally runs on HTTPS then the web server of the site will 
reply to the HTTP request with the 302 redirect code, telling the 
users browser to request the HTTPS URL instead. Figure 6 
shows what this looks like in the network analysis tool 
Wireshark. The website requested normally runs on HTTPS as 
it contains a login form, however the URL request defaulted to 
HTTP. Therefore the web server sent a redirect telling the 
browser to instead request the HTTPS version of the website. 
 
 
Fig 6: HTTP GET request for a website followed immediately by a 302 
redirect 
 
What sslstrip does is it watches HTTP traffic on a network 
and whenever it detects “https://” in a URL request, it intercepts 
the communication and changes it to “http://”. Whenever such a 
connection is detected, sslstrip will then initiate a SSL 
connection to the desired server and then forwards on the request 
as normal as if nothing had changed. This way the server never 
knows that the connection is being forwarded by sslstrip. 
Everything that is passed along through this connection can be 
read and logged in an unencrypted format. Incorporating this 
into the proxy detection system should theoretically allow for 
network packets being captured by the system to be in an 
unencrypted format and for the packets to appear normal outside 
of the system. This would allow the system to apply its proxy 
detection techniques to proxy packets that would normally be 
encrypted and unreadable. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Research up to this point has shown that it is possible to improve 
on current methods of defeating proxy usage within an enterprise 
network. The majority of current methods for detecting and 
blocking proxies rely on variables that can be changed very 
easily such as URL addresses and IP addresses. The method 
proposed in this report aims at using the contents of the network 
packets and the format of the URL generated by an anonymising 
proxy as the foundations for a rule base to be used to reliably 
and accurately detect whenever a proxy has been used. Then 
adaptive learning techniques will be applied to classify network 
traffic and identify its origin. Any proxy traffic identified using 
this approach will be added to the rule base by the system. This 
research will also attempt to address the problem of anonymous 
proxies using encryption through the incorporation of the 
existing tool sslstrip, which will provide access to unencrypted 
packets to the detection system. Additional information will be 
required to assess the usefulness of IP geo-location in the project. 
Further research and testing will be carried out to see if its 
inclusion has a substantial impact. Finally, additional 
investigation will be carried out regarding the effectiveness of 
fuzzy logic or neural networks with a view to classifying 
network traffic. 
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